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Introduction
Despite numerous advances, the field of molec-
ular biology has often struggled to address key 
biological problems affecting public health and 
the environment. Until recently, editing the 
genomes of even model organisms has been dif-
ficult. Moreover, altered traits typically reduce ev-
olutionary fitness and are consequently eliminated 
by natural selection. This restriction has profoundly 
limited our ability to alter ecosystems through 
molecular biology.
If we could develop a general method of 
ensuring that engineered traits would instead be 
favored by natural selection, then those traits 
could spread to most members of wild populations 
over many generations. This capability would 
allow us to address several major world problems, 
including the spread of insect-borne diseases, the 
rise of pesticide and herbicide resistance, and the 
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Abstract Gene drives may be capable of addressing ecological problems by altering entire 
populations of wild organisms, but their use has remained largely theoretical due to technical 
constraints. Here we consider the potential for RNA-guided gene drives based on the CRISPR 
nuclease Cas9 to serve as a general method for spreading altered traits through wild populations 
over many generations. We detail likely capabilities, discuss limitations, and provide novel 
precautionary strategies to control the spread of gene drives and reverse genomic changes. The 
ability to edit populations of sexual species would offer substantial benefits to humanity and the 
environment. For example, RNA-guided gene drives could potentially prevent the spread of 
disease, support agriculture by reversing pesticide and herbicide resistance in insects and weeds, 
and control damaging invasive species. However, the possibility of unwanted ecological effects and 
near-certainty of spread across political borders demand careful assessment of each potential 
application. We call for thoughtful, inclusive, and well-informed public discussions to explore the 
responsible use of this currently theoretical technology.
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agricultural and environmental damage wrought 
by invasive species.
Scientists have long known of naturally occur-
ring selfish genetic elements that can increase 
the odds that they will be inherited. This advan-
tage allows them to spread through popula-
tions even if they reduce the fitness of individual 
organisms. Many researchers have suggested 
that these elements might serve as the basis for 
‘gene drives’ capable of spreading engineered 
traits through wild populations (Craig et al., 1960; 
Wood et al., 1977; Sinkins and Gould, 2006; 
Burt and Trivers, 2009; Alphey, 2014). Austin 
Burt was the first to propose gene drives based 
on site-specific ‘homing’ endonuclease genes 
over a decade ago (Burt, 2003). These genes 
bias inheritance by cutting the homologous chro-
mosome, inducing the cell to copy them when it 
repairs the break. Several efforts have focused Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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on the possibility of using gene drives targeting 
mosquitoes to block malaria transmission (Scott 
et al., 2002; Windbichler et al., 2007, 2008, 
2011;  Li et al., 2013a;  Galizi et al., 2014). 
However, development has been hindered by the 
difficulty of engineering homing endonucleases 
to cut new target sequences (Chan et al., 2013a; 
Thyme et al., 2013;  Takeuchi et al., 2014). 
Attempts to build gene drives with more easily 
retargeted zinc-finger nucleases and TALENs suf-
fered from instability due to the repetitive nature 
of the genes encoding them (Simoni et al., 2014).
The recent discovery and development of the 
RNA-guided Cas9 nuclease has dramatically 
enhanced our ability to engineer the genomes of 
diverse species. Originally isolated from ‘CRISPR’ 
acquired immune systems in bacteria, Cas9 is a 
non-repetitive enzyme that can be directed to cut 
almost any DNA sequence by simply expressing a 
‘guide RNA’ containing that same sequence. In 
little more than a year following the first dem-
onstrations in human cells, it has enabled gene 
insertion, deletion, and replacement in many dif-
ferent species (Bassett et al., 2013; Cho et al., 
2013; Cong et al., 2013; DiCarlo et al., 2013; 
Friedland et al., 2013; Gratz et al., 2013; Hu   
et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 
2013a,  2013b;  Jinek et al., 2013;  Li et al., 
2013b;  Mali et al., 2013c;  Tan et al., 2013; 
Upadhyay et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013b).
Building RNA-guided gene drives based on 
the Cas9 nuclease is a logical way to overcome 
the targeting and stability problems hindering 
gene drive development. Less obvious is the 
extent to which the unique properties of Cas9 
are well-suited to overcoming other molecular 
and evolutionary challenges inherent to the con-
struction of safe and functional gene drives.
We submit that Cas9 is highly likely to enable 
scientists to construct efficient RNA-guided gene 
drives not only in mosquitoes, but in many other 
species. In addition to altering populations of 
insects to prevent them from spreading disease 
(Curtis, 1968), this advance would represent an 
entirely new approach to ecological engineering 
with many potential applications relevant to human 
health, agriculture, biodiversity, and ecological 
science.
The first technical descriptions of endonuclease 
gene drives were provided by Austin Burt in his 
landmark proposal to engineer wild populations 
more than a decade ago (Burt, 2003). Any of the 
rapidly expanding number of laboratories with 
expertise in Cas9-mediated genome engineering 
could attempt to build a gene drive by substituting 
Cas9 for the homing endonucleases described in 
his proposal. Indeed, the well-recognized poten-
tial for gene drives to combat vector-borne dis-
eases such as malaria and dengue virtually ensures 
that this strategy will eventually be attempted in 
mosquitoes.
While considerable scholarship has been   
devoted to the question of how gene drives 
might be safely utilized in mosquitoes (Scott   
et al., 2002; Touré et al., 2004; Benedict et al., 
2008;  Marshall, 2009;  UNEP, 2010;  Reeves   
et al., 2012; David et al., 2013; Alphey, 2014), 
few if any studies have examined the potential 
ecological effects of gene drives in other species. 
After all, constructing a drive to spread a partic-
ular genomic alteration in a given species was 
simply not feasible with earlier genome editing 
methods. Disconcertingly, several published gene 
drive architectures could lead to extinction or 
other hazardous consequences if applied to 
sensitive species, demonstrating an urgent need 
for improved methods of controlling these ele-
ments. After consulting with experts in many fields 
as well as concerned environmental organizations, 
we are confident that the responsible develop-
ment of RNA-guided gene drive technology is 
best served by full transparency and early engage-
ment with the public.
Here we provide brief overviews of gene 
drives and Cas9-mediated genome engineering, 
detail the mechanistic reasons that RNA-guided 
gene drives are likely to be effective in many 
species, and outline probable capabilities and 
limitations. We further propose novel gene drive 
architectures that may substantially improve our 
control over gene drives and their effects, discuss 
possible applications, and suggest guidelines 
for the safe development and evaluation of this 
promising but as yet unrealized technology. A dis-
cussion of risk governance and regulation intended 
specifically for policymakers is published separately 
(Oye et al., 2014).
Natural gene drives
In nature, certain genes ‘drive’ themselves through 
populations by increasing the odds that they will 
be inherited (Burt and Trivers, 2009). Examples 
include endonuclease genes that copy them-
selves into chromosomes lacking them (Burt 
and Koufopanou, 2004), segregation distorters 
that destroy competing chromosomes during 
meiosis (Lyttle, 1991), transposons that insert 
copies of themselves elsewhere in the genome 
(Charlesworth and Langley, 1989), Medea ele-
ments that eliminate competing siblings who do 
not inherit them (Beeman et al., 1992; Chen   Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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et al., 2007), and heritable microbes such as 
Wolbachia (Werren, 1997).
Endonuclease gene drives
Natural homing endonuclease genes exhibit 
drive by cutting the corresponding locus of chro-
mosomes lacking them. This induces the cell to 
repair the break by copying the nuclease gene 
onto the damaged chromosome via homologous 
recombination (Figure 1A) (Burt and Koufopanou, 
2004). The copying process is termed ‘homing’, 
while the endonuclease-containing cassette that 
is copied is referred to as a ‘gene drive’ or simply 
a ‘drive’. Because copying causes the fraction of 
offspring that inherit the cassette to be greater than 
1/2 (Figure 1B), these genes can drive through 
a population even if they reduce the reproductive 
fitness of the individual organisms that carry them. 
Over many generations, this self-sustaining pro-
cess can theoretically allow a gene drive to spread 
from a small number of individuals until it is pre-
sent in all members of a population.
Engineered gene drives
To build an endonuclease gene drive, an endonu-
clease transgene must be inserted in place of a 
natural sequence that it can cut. If it can efficiently 
cut this sequence in organisms with one transgene 
and one natural locus, reliably induce the cell to 
copy the transgene, and avoid being too costly to 
the organism, it will spread through susceptible 
wild populations.
Standard drives spread genomic changes and 
associated traits through populations. Burt‘s orig-
inal study proposed using them to drive the 
spread of other transgenes or to disrupt existing 
genes (Figure 2A,B) (Burt, 2003). The gene drive 
copying step can take place immediately upon 
fertilization (Figure 2C) or occur only in germline 
cells that are immediate precursors to sperm or 
eggs, leaving most of the organism‘s somatic 
cells with only one copy of the drive (Figure 2D).
Suppression drives reduce the size of the targeted 
population. Austin Burt outlined an elegant strategy 
involving the use of gene drives to disrupt genes 
that cause infertility or lethality only when both 
copies are lost (Burt, 2003). These ‘genetic load’ 
drives would spread rapidly through minimally 
impaired heterozygotes when rare, and eventu-
ally cause the population to crash or even become 
extinct due to the accumulated load of recessive 
mutations. A second approach would mimic natu-
rally occurring ‘meiotic’ or ‘gametic’ drives that bias 
the sex ratio (Craig et al., 1960; Hickey and Craig, 
1966; Hamilton, 1967; Newton et al., 1976; 
Wood and Newton, 1991). In this model, the Y 
chromosome (or its equivalent in other sex-
determination systems) would encode an endo-
nuclease that cuts and destroys the X chromosome 
during male meiosis, thereby ensuring that 
most viable sperm contain a Y chromosome 
(Newton et al., 1976;  Wood and Newton, 
1991; Windbichler et al., 2007, 2008; Galizi 
et al., 2014). The progressively dwindling number 
of females will culminate in a population crash 
or extinction (Craig et al., 1960; Lyttle, 1977; 
Burt, 2003; Schliekelman et al., 2005; Deredec 
et al., 2008,  2011;  North et al., 2013;  Burt, 
2014).
Whether a standard gene drive will spread 
through a target population depends on molec-
ular factors such as homing efficiency, fitness 
cost, and evolutionary stability (Marshall and 
Hay, 2012); only the rate of spread is determined 
by the mating dynamics, generation time, and 
other characteristics of the target population. 
In contrast, models suggest that the deleterious 
and complex effects of genetic load and sex-
biasing suppression drives render them more 
sensitive to population-specific ecological vari-
ables such as density-dependent selection (Burt, 
2003; Schliekelman et al., 2005; Huang et al., 
2007; Deredec et al., 2008; Marshall, 2009; 
Yahara et al., 2009; Deredec et al., 2011; Alphey 
and Bonsall, 2014).
No engineered endonuclease gene drive 
capable of spreading through a wild population 
has yet been published. However, the Crisanti and 
Russell laboratories have constructed gene drives 
that can only spread through laboratory mosquito 
(Windbichler et al., 2011) and fruit fly (Chan   
et al., 2011; Simoni et al., 2014) populations that 
have been engineered to contain the endonucle-
ase cut site. The Burt and Crisanti laboratories are 
attempting to build a male-biasing suppression 
drive using an endonuclease that serendipitously 
cuts a conserved sequence repeated hundreds 
of times in the X chromosome of the mosquito 
Anopheles gambiae (Windbichler et al., 2007, 
2008; Galizi et al., 2014). If successful, their work 
promises to substantially reduce the population of 
this important malaria vector.
All engineered gene drives based on homing 
endonucleases cut the natural recognition site of 
the relevant enzyme. Despite early hopes, it has 
proven difficult to engineer homing endonucle-
ases to cleave new target sequences. Numerous 
laboratories have sought to accomplish this goal 
for well over a decade with only a few recent suc-
cesses (Chan et al., 2013a; Thyme et al., 2013; 
Takeuchi et al., 2014). More recently, a team Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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constructed new versions of the fruit fly gene drive 
using modular zinc-finger nucleases or TALENs in 
place of the homing endonuclease (Simoni et al., 
2014), both of which can be engineered to cut 
new target sequences. While initially successful at 
cutting and homing, both declined in effectiveness 
over time due to the evolutionary instability of the 
modular repeats inherent to those proteins.
These early attempts demonstrate that it is 
possible to build synthetic gene drives, but also 
emphasize the importance of cutting any desired 
gene and remaining stable during copying. The 
recent discovery of the RNA-guided Cas9 nuclease 
represents a possible solution.
RNA-guided genome editing via the Cas9 
nuclease
One straightforward method of genome editing 
relies on the same mechanism employed by 
endonuclease gene drives: cut the target gene 
and supply an edited version for the cell to use as 
a template when it fixes the damage. Most eukar-
yotic genome engineering over the past decade 
was accomplished using zinc-finger nucleases 
(Urnov et al., 2005) or TALENs (Christian et al., 
2010), both of which are modular proteins that 
can be redesigned or evolved to target new 
sequences, albeit only by specialist laboratories 
(Esvelt and Wang, 2013). Genome editing was 
democratized by the discovery and adaptation of 
Cas9, an enzyme that can be programmed to cut 
target DNA sequences specified by a guiding 
RNA molecule (Deltcheva et al., 2011;  Jinek   
et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2013; Cong et al., 2013; 
Jinek et al., 2013; Mali et al., 2013c).
Cas9 is a component of Type II CRISPR 
acquired immune systems in bacteria, which 
allow cells to ‘remember’ the sequences of pre-
viously encountered viral genomes and protect 
themselves by recognizing and cutting those 
sequences if encountered again. They accom-
plish this by incorporating DNA fragments into 
a memory element, transcribing it to produce 
RNAs with the same sequence, and directing Cas9 
to cut any matching DNA sequences (Deltcheva 
et al., 2011). The only restriction is that Cas9 
will only cut target ‘protospacer’ sequences that 
are flanked by a protospacer-adjacent motif 
(PAM) at the 3′ end. The most commonly used 
Cas9 ortholog has a PAM with only two required 
bases (NGG) and therefore can cut protospac-
ers found approximately every 8 base pairs 
(Jinek et al., 2012).
Remarkably, it is possible to direct Cas9 to 
cut a specific protospacer in the genome using 
only a single guide RNA (sgRNA) less than 100 
base pairs in length (Jinek et al., 2012). This 
guide RNA must begin with a 17-20 base pair 
‘spacer’ sequence identical to the targeted proto-
spacer sequence in the genome (Fu et al., 2014).   
Figure 1. The spread of endonuclease gene drives.  
(A) When an organism carrying an endonuclease gene 
drive (blue) mates with a wild-type organism (grey), the 
gene drive is preferentially inherited by all offspring. 
This can enable the drive to spread until it is present  
in all members of the population–even if it is mildly 
deleterious to the organism. (B) Endonuclease gene 
drives are preferentially inherited because the endonu-
clease cuts the homologous wild-type chromosome. 
When the cell repairs the break using homologous 
recombination, it must use the gene drive chromosome 
as a repair template, thereby copying the drive onto the 
wild-type chromosome. If the endonuclease fails to cut 
or the cell uses the competing non-homologous 
end-joining repair pathway, the drive is not copied,  
so efficient gene drives must reliably cut when 
homology-directed repair is most likely.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.002Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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The process of editing a target gene involves 
choosing protospacers within the gene, building 
one or more guide RNAs with matching spac-
ers, and delivering Cas9, guide RNAs, and an 
edited repair template lacking those proto-
spacers into the cell (Figure 3).
Cas9 is efficient enough to cut and edit multiple 
genes in a single experiment (Li et al., 2013c; 
Wang et al., 2013a). The enzyme is active in   
a wide variety of organisms and is also quite spe-
cific, cutting only protospacers that are nearly 
identical to the spacer sequence of the guide RNA 
(Hsu et al., 2013; Mali et al., 2013a; Pattanayak 
et al., 2013). Moreover, methods that allow 
Cas9 to bind but not cut enable the expression 
of target genes to be regulated by selectively 
recruiting regulatory proteins attached to Cas9 
or the guide RNA (Gilbert et al., 2013; Mali et al., 
2013a). All of these applications were devel-
oped within the last two years.
Because RNA-guided genome editing relies 
on exactly the same copying mechanism as 
endonuclease gene drives, it is reasonable to 
ask whether it might be possible to build gene 
drives based on Cas9. In principle, RNA-guided 
gene drives might be capable of spreading 
almost any genomic alteration that can be gener-
ated using Cas9 through sexually reproducing 
populations.
Will RNA-guided gene  
drives enable us to edit the 
genomes of wild populations?
Although we cannot be certain until we try, cur-
rent evidence suggests that RNA-guided gene 
drives will function in some and possibly most 
sexually reproducing species. Learning how to 
insert a drive into the germline and optimize its 
function in each new species will likely require 
months to years depending on generation 
length, with subsequent drives in the same spe-
cies taking less time. Because inserting the 
drive into the germline with Cas9 involves the 
same molecular copying process as the drive 
itself will utilize, successful insertion may produce 
a working if not particularly efficient RNA-
guided gene drive. But if population-level engi-
neering is to become a reality, all molecular 
factors relevant to homing – cutting, specificity, 
copying, and evolutionary robustness – must be 
considered. Below, we provide a detailed technical 
analysis of the extent to which Cas9 can address 
each of these challenges. Capabilities, limitations, 
control strategies, and possible applications are 
discussed in subsequent sections.
Cutting
The first requirement for every endonuclease gene 
drive is to cut the target sequence. Incomplete 
cutting was a problem for the homing endonuclease 
drive constructed in transgenic mosquitoes (72% 
cutting) and also for the homing endonuclease, 
zinc-finger nuclease, and TALEN drives in fruit 
flies (37%, 86%, and 70% cutting) (Windbichler 
et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2013b; Simoni et al., 
2014). The simplest way to increase cutting is to 
target multiple adjacent sequences. However, this 
is impractical for homing endonucleases and quite 
difficult for zinc-finger nucleases and TALENs,   
as each additional sequence requires a new 
nuclease protein to be engineered or evolved 
and then co-expressed.
In contrast, the RNA-guided Cas9 nuclease 
can be readily directed to cleave additional 
sequences by expressing additional guide RNAs 
Figure 2. Consequences and timing of gene drive 
replication. (A) Gene drives can carry other genes 
with them as cargo. For example, a transgene that 
blocks malaria transmission could be driven through 
wild mosquito populations. There is no selection to 
maintain the function of a cargo gene. (B) Gene 
drives can disrupt or replace other genes. For 
example, a drive might replace a mosquito gene 
important for malaria transmission. Because it  
cannot spread without disrupting the target gene, 
this strategy is evolutionarily stable. (C) If homing 
occurs in the zygote or early embryo, all organisms 
that carry the drive will be homozygous in all of their 
tissues. (D) If homing occurs in the late germline cells 
that contribute to sperm or eggs, the offspring will 
remain heterozygous in most tissues and avoid the 
consequences of drive-induced disruptions.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.003Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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out of six tested guide RNAs (Kondo and Ueda, 
2013). The two least effective guide RNAs indi-
vidually cut at rates exceeding 12% and 56%, but 
exhibited cutting rates above 91% when com-
bined. Using more than two guide RNAs should 
further enhance cutting. The notable success of 
Cas9-based genome engineering in many dif-
ferent species, including studies that targeted 
every gene in the genome (Shalem et al., 2014; 
Wang et al., 2014), demonstrates that most 
sequences can be efficiently targeted independent 
of species and cell type. Thus, RNA-guided gene 
drives should be capable of efficiently cutting any 
given gene.
Specificity
Because cutting other sites in the genome may 
seriously compromise the fitness of the organism, 
the second requirement is to avoid cutting non-
targeted sequences.
While several studies have reported that Cas9 
is prone to cutting off-target sequences that are 
closely related to the target (Fu et al., 2013; Hsu 
et al., 2013; Mali et al., 2013a; Pattanayak et al., 
2013), more recent developments and strategies 
designed to improve specificity (Mali et al., 2013a; 
Fu et al., 2014; Guilinger et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 
2014) have demonstrated that the off-target rate 
can be reduced to nearly undetectable levels 
(Figure 4). Notably, Cas9 does not appear to rep-
resent a noticeable fitness burden when expressed 
at a moderate level in fruit flies with or without 
guide RNAs (Kondo and Ueda, 2013). Organisms 
with larger genomes may require more careful tar-
get site selection due to the increased number of 
potential off-target sequences present.
Copying
The third and most challenging requirement 
involves ensuring that the cut sequence is repaired 
using homologous recombination (HR) to copy the 
drive rather than the competing non-homologous 
end-joining (NHEJ) pathway (Figure 4). HR rates 
are known to vary across cell types (Mali et al., 
2013c), developmental stages (Fiorenza et al., 
2001; Preston et al., 2006), species (Chan et al., 
2013b), and the phase of the cell cycle (Saleh-
Gohari and Helleday, 2004). For example, the 
endonuclease gene drive in mosquitoes was cor-
rectly copied following ∼97% of cuts (Windbichler 
et al., 2011), while a similar drive in fruit flies was 
initially copied only 2% of the time (Chan et al., 
2011) and never rose above 78% even with exten-
sive combinatorial optimization of promoter and 3′ 
untranslated region. This difference is presumably 
Figure 3. RNA-guided genome editing via Cas9. The 
Cas9 nuclease protein and guide RNA must first be 
delivered into the target cell. This is often accom-
plished by transfecting DNA expression plasmids, but 
delivering RNA is also effective. The guide RNA directs 
Cas9 to bind target DNA ‘protospacer’ sequences that  
match the ‘spacer’ sequence within the guide RNA. 
Protospacers must be flanked by an appropriate 
protospacer-adjacent motif (PAM), which is NGG for the 
most commonly used Cas9 protein (Jinek et al., 2012). 
If the spacer and protospacer are identical or have only 
a few mismatches at the 5′ end of the spacer, Cas9 
will cut both strands of DNA, creating a blunt-ended 
double-strand break. If supplied with a repair template 
containing the desired changes and homology to the 
sequences on either side of the break, the cell may 
use homologous recombination to repair the break 
by incorporating the repair template into the chromo-
some. Otherwise, the break will be repaired by non- 
homologous end-joining, resulting in gene disruption. 
Cas9 cutting is efficient enough to alter both chromo-
somes at the same time and/or to edit multiple genes 
at once (Li et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013a). If the 
cell being edited is a germline cell that gives rise to 
eggs or sperm, the changes can be inherited by future 
generations.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.004
(Figure 4). The sequences of these additional 
guide RNAs can be altered so as to avoid creating 
unstable repeats within the drive cassette 
(Nishimasu et al., 2014; Simoni et al., 2014). 
Including more guides has been demonstrated to 
improve upon already high rates of cutting. For 
example, fruit flies expressing both Cas9 and 
guide RNAs in their germline exhibited target 
cutting rates exceeding 85–99% in males for four Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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Figure 4. Technical advantages of RNA-guided gene drives. Clockwise from lower left: The targeting 
flexibility of Cas9 permits the exclusive selection of target sequences with few potential off-targets in the 
genome. Targeting multiple sites increases the cutting frequency and hinders the evolution of drive resistant 
alleles, which must accumulate mutations at all of the sites. The Cas9 nuclease is can be quite specific in the 
sequences that it targets; fruit flies do not exhibit notable fertility or fitness defects resulting from off-target 
cutting when both Cas9 nuclease and guide RNAs are expressed in the germline (Kondo and Ueda, 2013). 
Choosing target sites with few or no close relatives in the genome, using truncated guide RNAs (Fu et al., 
2014), employing paired Cas9 nickases (Mali et al., 2013a) instead of nucleases, or utilizing Cas9-FokI 
fusion proteins (Guilinger et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2014) can further increase specificity. Several of these 
strategies can reduce the off-target mutation rate to borderline undetectable levels (Fu et al., 2014; 
Guilinger et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2014). The frequency at which the drive is correctly copied might be 
increased by using Cas9 as a transcriptional regulator to activate HR genes and repress NHEJ genes  
(Gilbert et al., 2013; Mali et al., 2013a) (Figure 4—figure supplement 1). By choosing target sites within 
an essential gene, any non-homologous end-joining event that deletes all of the target sites will cause 
lethality rather than creating a drive-resistant allele, further increasing the evolutionary robustness of  
the RNA-guided gene drive. Other options include using distinct promoters and guide RNAs to avoid 
repetitiveness and increase stability (Figure 4—figure supplement 2) or employing newly characterized, 
engineered, or evolved Cas9 variants with improved properties (Esvelt et al., 2011; Mali et al., 2013b). 
These optimization strategies have also been summarized in tabular form with additional details 
(Figure 4—figure supplement 3).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.005
The following figure supplements are available for figure 4:
Figure supplement 1. Enhancing drive copying by regulating endogenous genes. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.006
Figure supplement 2. Repetitiveness and evolutionary stability of multiple guide RNAs. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.007
Figure supplement 3. Table of known technological advances that might be adapted to optimize gene 
drive efficiency. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.008Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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due to a lower rate of HR in fruit fly spermatocytes 
relative to mosquitoes (Chan et al., 2013b). Ideally, 
drives should be activated only in germline cells at 
developmental stages with a high rate of HR, but 
this may be challenging in many species.
Copying efficiencies may also depend on whether 
the cut produces 5′-overhangs, 3′-overhangs, or 
blunt ends (Kuhar et al., 2014). Because Cas9 
nickases can generate either overhang type while 
Cas9 nucleases produce blunt ends, the enzyme 
can be adapted to the needs of the cell type and 
organism.
The ability to regulate gene expression with 
Cas9 might be used to temporarily increase the 
rate of homologous recombination while the 
drive is active (Figure 4). For instance, the Cas9 
nuclease involved in cutting might simultaneously 
repress (Gilbert et al., 2013) genes involved in 
NHEJ and therefore increase the frequency of HR 
(Bozas et al., 2009) if supplied with a shortened 
guide RNA that directs it to bind and block 
transcription but not cut (Bikard et al., 2013; 
Sternberg et al., 2014). Alternatively, an orthog-
onal nuclease-null Cas9 protein (Esvelt et al., 
2013) encoded within the drive cassette could 
repress NHEJ genes and activate HR genes 
before activating the Cas9 nuclease. Lastly, Cas9 
might be used directly recruit key HR-directing 
proteins to the cut sites, potentially biasing repair 
towards that pathway.
Evolutionary stability
Even a perfectly efficient endonuclease gene 
drive is vulnerable to the evolution of drive resist-
ance in the population. Whenever a cut is repaired 
using the NHEJ pathway, the result is typically a 
drive-resistant allele with insertions or dele-
tions in the target sequence that prevent it 
from being cut by the endonuclease. Natural 
sequence polymorphisms in the population could 
also prevent cutting. These alleles will typically 
increase in abundance and eventually eliminate 
the drive because most drives – like most 
transgenes – are likely to slightly reduce the fit-
ness of the organism. A second path to gene 
drive resistance would involve the target organism 
evolving a method of specifically inhibiting the 
drive endonuclease.
The best defense against previously existing 
or recently evolved drive-resistant alleles is to 
target multiple sites. Because mutations in tar-
get sites are evolutionarily favored only when 
they survive confrontation with the gene drive, 
using many target sites can render it statisti-
cally improbable for any one allele to survive 
long enough to accumulate mutations at all of 
the sites so long as cutting rates are high (Burt, 
2003). However, very large populations – such 
as those of some insects – might require unfea-
sibly large numbers of guide RNAs to prevent 
resistance. In these cases it may be necessary 
to release several successive gene drives, each 
targeting multiple sites, to overcome resistant 
alleles as they emerge. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the ability to preclude resistance 
by targeting multiple sites is the single greatest 
advantage of RNA-guided gene drives.
We propose to extend this strategy by prefer-
entially targeting multiple sites within the 3′ ends 
of genes important for fitness such that any repair 
event that deletes all of the target sites creates 
a deleterious allele that cannot compete with 
the spread of the drive (Figure 4). Whenever the 
drive is copied, the cut gene is replaced with   
a recoded version flanked by the other compo-
nents of the drive. Recent work has demon-
strated that most genes can be substantially 
recoded with little effect on organism fitness 
(Lajoie et al., 2013); the 3′ untranslated region 
might be replaced with an equivalent sequence 
from a related gene. Because there would be 
no homology between the recoded cut site and 
the drive components, the drive cassette would 
always be copied as a unit.
Relative to drive-resistant alleles, inhibitors of 
Cas9 are less likely to arise given the historical 
absence of RNA-guided nucleases from eukary-
otes. Any inhibitors that do evolve would presum-
ably target a particular Cas9 protein or guide RNA 
used in an earlier drive and could be evaded by 
building future drives using a Cas9 ortholog with a 
different guide RNA (Esvelt et al., 2013; Fonfara 
et al., 2013). Alternatively and least likely, organ-
isms might evolve higher RNase activity to prefer-
entially degrade all guide RNAs; this may be difficult 
to accomplish without harming overall fitness.
A final evolutionary concern relates to the   
stability of the gene drive cassette itself. The zinc-
finger nuclease and TALEN-based gene drives in 
fruit flies suffered from recombination between 
repetitive sequences: only 75% and 40% of each 
respective drive was sufficiently intact after one 
copying event to catalyze a second round of 
copying. Because RNA-guided gene drives will 
not include such highly repetitive elements, they 
are likely to be more stable (Figure 4).
Development time
RNA-guided genome editing is advancing at a 
historically unprecedented pace. Because it is Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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now much easier to make transgenic organisms 
and therefore candidate gene drives, the design-
build-test cycle for gene drives will often be 
limited only by the generation time of the organism 
in the laboratory. Moreover, many advances from 
genome engineering can be directly applied to 
RNA-guided gene drives. For example, all of the 
methods of increasing Cas9 specificity described 
above were developed for RNA-guided genome 
editing in the past 2 years. Future methods of 
increasing the rate of HR relative to NHEJ would 
be useful for both technologies. These factors 
suggest that scientists will enjoy an increasing 
number of tools well-suited to rapidly building 
and testing gene drives in addition to those we 
describe above.
None of this is to gloss over the many practical 
difficulties that are likely to arise when construct-
ing a particular gene drive in a given species. 
Early success is as unlikely as ever when engi-
neering complex biological systems. But if half a 
dozen or even a dozen design-build-test cycles 
are sufficient to produce moderately efficient 
gene drives, many molecular biology laboratories 
around the world will soon be capable of engi-
neering wild populations.
Gene drive limitations
Given their potentially widespread availability, it 
will be essential to develop a comprehensive   
understanding of the fundamental limitations of 
genetic drive systems.
First and most important, gene drives require 
many generations to spread through popula-
tions. Once transgenic organisms bearing the 
gene drive are constructed in the laboratory, 
they must be released into the wild to mate with 
wild-type individuals in order to begin the pro-
cess of spreading the drive through the wild 
population. The total time required to spread   
to all members depends on the number of drive-
carrying individuals that are released, the gener-
ation time of the organism, the efficiency of 
homing, the impact of the drive on individual 
fitness, and the dynamics of mating and gene 
flow in the population, but in general it will take 
several dozen generations (Burt, 2003; Huang 
et al., 2007; Deredec et al., 2008; Marshall, 
2009;  Yahara et al., 2009;  Deredec et al., 
2011). Thus, drives will spread very quickly in 
fast-reproducing species but only slowly in long-
lived organisms.
Second, gene drives cannot affect species 
that exclusively practice asexual reproduction 
through clonal division or self-fertilization. This 
Box 1. Could gene 
drives alter human 
populations?
Not unless we wait for many centuries. 
Even in a hypothetical future in which 
human germline editing was considered 
safe and ethical, a driven alteration would 
be only four times as abundant as a 
non-driven alteration a full century after the 
birth of an edited human. This assumes 
future generations would not elect to 
remove the drive. Whole-genome se-
quencing - a technology that is available in 
many modern hospitals and is widely 
expected to be ubiquitous in the near 
future - is quite capable of detecting the 
presence of any gene drive if we decide to 
look.
category includes all viruses and bacteria as 
well as most unicellular organisms. Highly effi-
cient standard drives might be able to slowly 
spread through populations that employ a mix 
of sexual and asexual reproduction, such as cer-
tain plants, but drives intended to suppress the 
population would presumably force target 
organisms to reproduce asexually in order to 
avoid suppression.
Third, drive-mediated genome alterations are 
not permanent on an evolutionary timescale. 
While gene drives can spread traits through pop-
ulations even if they are costly to each individual 
organism, harmful traits will eventually be out-
competed by more fit alleles after the drive has 
gone to fixation. Highly deleterious traits may be 
eliminated even more quickly, with non-functional 
versions appearing in large numbers even before 
the drive and its cargo can spread to all members 
of the population. Even when the trait is perfectly 
linked to the drive mechanism, the selection pres-
sure favoring the continued function of Cas9 and 
the guide RNAs will relax once the drive reaches 
fixation. Maintaining deleterious traits within a 
population indefinitely is likely to require sched-
uled releases of new RNA-guided gene drives to 
periodically overwrite the broken versions in the 
environment.
Fourth, our current knowledge of the risk 
management (Scott et al., 2002; Touré et al., 
2004; UNEP, 2010; McGraw and O’Neill, 2013; Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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Alphey, 2014) and containment (Benedict et 
al., 2008;  Marshall, 2009) issues associated 
with gene drives is largely due to the efforts of 
researchers focused on mosquito-borne illnesses. 
Frameworks for evaluating ecological conse-
quences are similarly focused on mosquitoes 
(David et al., 2013) and the few other organisms 
for which alternative genetic biocontrol methods 
have been considered (Dana et al., 2014). While 
these examples provide an invaluable starting 
point for investigations of RNA-guided gene 
drives targeting other organisms, studies examin-
ing the particular drive, population, and associ-
ated ecosystem in question will be needed.
Safeguards and control strategies
Given the potential for gene drives to alter 
entire wild populations and therefore ecosys-
tems, the development of this technology must 
include robust safeguards and methods of con-
trol (Oye et al., 2014). Whereas existing gene 
drive proposals focus on adding genes (Ito et al., 
2002), disrupting existing genes (Burt, 2003), 
or suppressing populations, RNA-guided gene 
drives will also be capable of replacing existing 
sequences with altered versions that have been 
recoded to remove the sites targeted by the 
drive (Figure 3). We hypothesize that the unique 
ability of RNA-guided gene drives to target any 
gene may allow them to control the effects of 
other gene drives or transgenes.
Reversibility
RNA-guided gene drives could reverse genome 
alterations that have already spread through 
populations. Suppose a given gene drive causes 
unexpected side-effects or is released without 
public consent. A ‘reversal’ drive released later 
could overwrite one or all genomic changes 
spread by the first drive (Figure 5A). The new 
sequence spread by the reversal drive must also 
be recoded relative to the original to keep the 
first drive from cutting it, but any amino acid 
changes introduced by the first drive could be 
undone. If necessary, a third drive could restore 
the exact wild-type sequence, leaving only the 
guide RNAs and the gene encoding Cas9 as 
signatures of past editing (Figure 5B).
The ability to update or reverse genomic altera-
tions at the speed of a drive, not just a drive-resist-
ant allele, represents an extremely important safety 
feature. Reversal drives could also remove conven-
tionally inserted transgenes that entered wild popu-
lations by cross-breeding or natural mutations that 
spread in response to human-induced selective 
pressures. However, it is important to note that 
even if a reversal drive were to reach all members of 
the population, any ecological changes caused in 
the interim would not necessarily be reversed.
Immunization
RNA-guided gene drives could be used to block 
the spread of other gene drives. For example,   
an ‘immunizing’ drive could prevent a specific   
unwanted drive from being copied by recoding 
sequences targeted by the unwanted drive 
(Figure 5A). This could be done preemptively 
or reactively and would spread on a timescale 
comparable to that of the unwanted drive. A 
combined ‘immunizing reversal’ drive might 
spread through both wild-type individuals and 
those affected by an earlier gene drive, con-
verting both types to a recoded version that 
could not be invaded by the unwanted drive 
(Figure 5B). This may represent the fastest method 
of neutralizing an already-released drive. As 
with a standard reversal drive, any ecological 
changes caused in the interim would not neces-
sarily be reversed.
Precisely targeting subpopulations
RNA-guided gene drives might be confined to 
a single genetically distinct target species   
Box 2. Could gene drives 
alter domesticated 
animals or crops?
In theory they could, though probably 
not without the permission of the 
farmers, scientists and breeders who 
typically monitor reproduction. For 
example, genetic records and artificial 
insemination are so common among 
cattle and other domesticated animals 
that it would be exceedingly difficult 
for a gene drive to spread through any 
of these species. Seed farms play a 
similar role for crops. Long generation 
times will represent a further barrier for 
many domesticated species. In general, 
our expectation is that beneficial 
applications are more likely to involve 
the alteration of weeds and insect pest 
populations rather than the crops 
themselves.Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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or even a subpopulation by targeting unique genes 
or sequence polymorphisms. Because these ‘pre-
cision drives’ will only cut the unique sequence, 
they will not be able to spread through non-tar-
get populations as long as that sequence is suffi-
ciently distinct. We estimate that either the PAM 
or at least five base pairs of the spacer must differ 
within each target site in order to prevent the 
guide RNAs in the drive from evolving to recognize 
the equivalent non-target sequence (Fu et al., 
2013;  Hsu et al., 2013;  Mali et al., 2013a; 
Pattanayak et al., 2013).
Populations that are not genetically distinct 
but experience only intermittent gene flow, such 
as those on islands, might be given a unique 
sequence permitting them to be specifically   
targeted by precision drives later on. For exam-
ple, releasing Drive A into the island population 
Figure 5. Methods of reversing, preventing, and controlling the spread and effects of gene drives. (A) Reversal 
drives could correct or reverse genomic alterations made by an earlier drive with unexpected side effects. They 
might also be used to reverse conventionally engineered or evolved changes. Immunization drives could prevent 
other gene drives from affecting a specific population or provide a population with resistance to DNA viruses. 
Precision drives could exclusively spread through a subpopulation with a unique gene or sequence. (B) Together, 
these can quickly halt an unwanted drive and eventually restore the sequence to the original wild-type save for the 
residual Cas9 and guide RNAs. (C) Any population with limited gene flow can be given a unique sequence by 
releasing drives A and B in quick succession. So long as drive A does not escape into other populations before it is 
completely replaced by drive B, subsequent precision drives can target population B without risking spread into 
other populations.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.009Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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would recode a target gene, but exhibit no 
other effect (Figure 5A). Releasing Drive B, a 
precision drive which would exclusively spread 
through Drive A but not the wild-type allele, 
would similarly replace Drive A with a unique 
sequence. So long as Drive A does not escape 
the island before being replaced, the unique 
sequence in the island population would allow it 
to be targeted with future precision drives that 
could not spread through mainland populations 
(Figure 5C).
Limiting population suppression
Population suppression may be one of the most 
powerful applications of gene drives. The previ-
ously described genetic load and sex-biasing 
drives (Burt, 2003) could potentially lead to   
extinction (Deredec et al., 2008, 2011). While 
this outcome may be necessary to achieve com-
pelling goals such as the eradication of malaria, 
other situations may call for more refined meth-
ods. Here we outline a handful of alternative 
architectures that would provide greater control 
over the extent of population suppression.
Chemical approaches to population control 
might utilize ‘sensitizing drives’ to render target 
organisms vulnerable to a particular molecule 
using one of three strategies (Figure 6). First, a 
sensitizing drive might reverse known mutations 
that confer resistance to existing pesticides or 
herbicides. Second, it might carry a prodrug- 
converting enzyme (Schellmann et al., 2010) that 
would render a prodrug molecule toxic to organisms 
that express it. Third, it could swap a conserved 
gene for a version that is strongly inhibited by   
a particular small molecule. Because sensitizing 
drives would have no effect in the absence of 
their associated molecule – and in some cases 
vice versa – they could grant very fine control over 
the geography and extent of population suppres-
sion with minimal ecological risk.
Temporal approaches to controlling populations 
would deliberately limit the lifetime of a suppres-
sion drive by rendering its effects evolutionarily 
unstable (Figure 6). For example, a male- 
determining or female-specific sterility gene car-
ried by a standard drive on an autosome would 
suppress the target population, but the effect 
would be short-lived because any drive that 
acquired a loss-of-function mutation in the cargo 
gene would be strongly favored by natural selec-
tion due to its ability to produce fertile female 
offspring. Notably, turning existing female-specific 
sterility lines (Fu et al., 2010; Labbe et al., 2012; 
Alphey, 2014) into unstable drives may increase 
their effectiveness. Periodically releasing organ-
isms carrying new unstable drives that are capable 
of replacing earlier broken versions could extend 
the suppression effect.
Genetic approaches to population control 
might initiate suppression only when two distinct 
‘interacting drives’ encounter one another 
(Figure 6). For example, a cross between standard 
drives A and B might produce sterile females and 
fertile males that pass on the ‘sterile-daughter’ 
trait when crossed with females of any type. 
Scattering A- and B-carrying individuals through-
out an existing population would produce many 
tiny pockets dominated by either A or B and very 
few organisms in between due to the infertility of 
AB females. Because each drive would spread 
from a small number of initially released individu-
als scattered over a wide area, this strategy may 
be capable of large-scale population suppression, 
but its effectiveness and resolution will depend 
on the average distance between released A and 
B individuals. Further suppressing the residual A 
and B populations could be accomplished by   
releasing only members of the opposite drive type. 
Modeling studies will be needed to determine 
whether this possibility is feasible for different spe-
cies. Interestingly, the use of this drive type would 
effectively induce speciation in the affected 
population.
Finally, immunizing drives might protect spe-
cific subpopulations from the effects of full-scale 
suppression drives released elsewhere (Figure 6). 
Assuming some degree of gene flow, the immu-
nized population will eventually replace the sup-
pressed population, though this might be delayed 
if crossing the two drives generates a sterile-
daughter effect as described above. Due to the 
comparatively uncontrolled spread of both drive 
types through the wild-type population, this 
method would only be suited to large geographic 
areas or subpopulations with limited gene flow. 
For example, immunization might be used to pro-
tect the native population of a species while sup-
pressing or eradicating populations on other 
continents.
Applications of RNA-guided gene 
drives
RNA-guided gene drives have the potential to 
merge the fields of genomic and ecological engi-
neering. They may enable us to address numerous 
problems in global health, agriculture, sustaina-
bility, ecological science, and many other areas 
(Figure 7). Of these opportunities, perhaps the 
most compelling involve curtailing the spread   Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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Figure 6. Controlling population suppression. Previously proposed genetic load and meiotic suppression 
drives spread without limit and may incur a substantial risk of extinction. Alternative gene drive types might be 
used to grant finer control over the extent of suppression. ‘Sensitization drives’ would be harmless save for 
conferring vulnerability to a particular chemical, which could then be used as a population-specific pesticide. 
Evolutionarily ‘unstable drives’ would place a limit on the average number of drive copying events and thus the 
extent of population suppression. ‘Interacting drives’ would initiate suppression only upon encountering a 
specific genetic signature in the population, in this case a different gene drive. The combination would create a 
sterile-daughter effect (Figure 6—figure supplement 1) capable of continuing suppression for several 
generations. Finally, an immunizing drive could protect a subpopulation from a full genetic load or male- 
biasing suppression drive employed elsewhere. Interacting drive and immunizing drive approaches would  
be effective on very large populations spread across substantial geographic areas (Figure 6—figure  
supplement 2) while suffering from correspondingly reduced geographic resolution and greater ecological  
risk (Figure 6—figure supplement 3). Resolutions are approximations only and will vary with the specific drive 
utilized in each class.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.010
The following figure supplements are available for figure 6:
Figure supplement 1. Sample interacting drives that produce a sterile-daughter effect. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.011
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of vector-borne infectious diseases, controlling 
agricultural pests, and reducing populations of 
environmentally and economically destructive 
invasive species.
Eradicating insect-borne diseases
The human toll inflicted by infectious diseases 
spread by insects is staggering. Malaria alone kills 
over 650,000 people each year, most of them 
children, while afflicting 200 million more with   
debilitating fevers (WHO, 2013). Dengue, yellow 
fever, chikungunya, trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, 
Chagas, and Lyme disease are also spread by 
insects. These afflictions could potentially be 
controlled or even eradicated by altering vector 
Figure supplement 2. An extreme example of ecological management: the use of suppression and immunizing 
drives to control rat populations worldwide. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.012
Figure supplement 3. Characteristics of population suppression drives. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.013
Figure 6. Continued
Box 3. What types of 
genes can be edited 
using gene drives?
Genes can be edited reliably if they are 
important to fitness. This is because NHEJ 
events that create drive-resistant alleles 
by deleting all the protospacer cut sites 
will only be harmful if they disrupt the 
function of important genes. NHEJ events 
in unimportant genes and sequences will 
produce drive-resistant alleles lacking the 
targeted sites. These will spread and 
interfere with propagation of the drive. As 
a result, unimportant genes can be 
reliably disrupted or deleted but not 
edited.
Genes that are carried as cargo will not 
be evolutionarily stable unless they directly 
contribute to the efficient function of the 
drive. This limits opportunities to spread 
transgenes unrelated to drive function, 
although periodically releasing new 
drives that overwrite earlier broken 
versions could potentially maintain 
functional cargo genes in a large fraction 
of the population.
species to block transmission. Several laborato-
ries have identified candidate gene disruptions or 
transgenes that interfere with the transmission of 
malaria (Ito et al., 2002; Dong et al., 2011; 
Isaacs et al., 2012) and other well-studied dis-
eases (Franz et al., 2006). Depending on their 
effectiveness, these alterations may or may not 
allow the disease to be eradicated before the 
pathogen evolves resistance. Alternatively, the 
relevant vector species might be suppressed or 
eliminated using RNA-guided gene drives, then 
potentially reintroduced from sheltered laboratory 
or island populations once disease eradication is 
complete. In the case of malaria, gene drive strat-
egies may represent particularly effective solutions 
to the emerging problem of mosquito vectors 
with an evolved preference to bite and rest out-
doors, traits that render them resistant to current 
control strategies based on indoor insecticide 
spraying and bednets.
Agricultural safety and sustainability
The evolution of resistance to pesticides and   
herbicides is a major problem for agriculture. It 
has been assumed that resistant populations will 
remain resistant unless the relevant alleles impose 
a substantial fitness cost in the absence of pesti-
cide or herbicide. We propose that RNA-guided 
sensitizing drives might replace resistant alleles 
with their ancestral equivalents to restore vulnera-
bility. For example, sensitizing drives could poten-
tially reverse the mutations allowing the western 
corn rootworm to resist Bt toxins (Gassmann   
et al., 2014) or horseweed and pigweed to resist 
the herbicide glyphosate (Gaines et al., 2010; 
Ge, 2010), which is currently essential to more 
sustainable no-till agriculture. Because these 
three organisms undergo one generation per 
year, comparatively large numbers of drive-bear-
ing individuals must be released to quickly exert 
an effect, but fewer than are already released to 
control pests using the sterile-insect technique 
(Gould and Schliekelman, 2004;  Dyck et al., 
2005). Releases would need to occur in local 
areas not treated with pesticide or herbicide, 
which would quickly become reservoirs of sensi-
tizing drives that could spread into adjacent Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
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Figure 7. Potential applications of RNA-guided gene 
drives. Clockwise from left. Disease vectors such as 
malarial mosquitoes might be engineered to resist 
pathogen acquisition or eliminated with a suppression 
drive. Wild populations that serve as reservoirs for 
human viruses could be immunized using Cas9, RNAi 
machinery, or elite controller antibodies carried by a 
gene drive. Reversal and immunization drives could 
help ensure that all transgenes are safe and controlled. 
Drives might quickly spread protective genes through 
threatened or soon-to-be-threatened species such as 
amphibians facing the expansion of chytrid fungus 
(Rosenblum et al., 2010). Invasive species might be 
locally controlled or eradicated without directly 
affecting others. Sensitizing drives could improve the 
sustainability and safety of pesticides and herbicides. 
Gene drives could test ecological hypotheses 
concerning gene flow, sex ratios, speciation, and 
evolution. Technical requirements for these  
applications vary with the drive type required  
(Figure 7—figure supplement 1).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.014
The following figure supplement is available for 
figure 7:
Figure supplement 1. Technical limitations of different 
gene drive architectures with implications for various 
applications. 
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.015
fields. Periodically releasing new drives could po-
tentially allow any given pesticide or herbicide to 
be utilized indefinitely. Modeling experiments will 
be needed to evaluate feasibility for different 
target species.
A second form of sensitizing drive could   
potentially render pest populations vulnerable to 
molecules that never previously affected them. 
For example, a gene important to fitness might 
be replaced with a version from another species 
or laboratory isolate whose function is sensitive to 
a particular compound. In principle, this approach 
could eventually lead to the development and 
use of safer and more species-specific pesticides 
and herbicides.
Controlling invasive species
One of the most environmentally damaging 
consequences of global economic activity is the 
introduction of invasive species, which often 
cause ecological disruption or even the extinc-
tion of native species. Isolated ecosystems such 
as those on small islands are especially vulner-
able. RNA-guided suppression drives might be 
used to promote biodiversity by controlling or 
even eradicating invasive species from islands 
or possibly entire continents. The economics of 
invasive species control are also compelling: 
the top ten invasives in the United States cause 
an estimated $42 billion in damages every year 
(Pimentel et al., 2005). Black and brown rats 
alone cause $19 billion in damages and may be 
responsible for more extinctions than any other 
nonhuman species.
Deploying RNA-guided suppression drives 
against invasive species will incur two primary 
risks related to undesired spread. First, rare mating 
events may allow the drive to affect closely   
related species. Using precision drives to target 
sequences unique to the invasive species could 
mitigate or eliminate this problem. Second, the 
suppression drive might spread from the invasive 
population back into the native habitat, perhaps 
even through intentional human action.
Native populations might be protected using 
an immunizing drive, but doing so would risk 
transferring immunity back into invasive popu-
lations. Instead, we might grant the invasive 
population a unique sequence with a standard 
drive (Figure 5C), verify that these changes have 
not spread to the native population, and only 
then release a suppression drive targeting the 
recoded sequences while holding an immunizing 
drive in reserve. Another approach might utilize a 
sensitizing drive to render all populations newly Emerging technology | Concerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild populations
Esvelt et al. eLife 2014;3:e03401. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401  16 of 21
Feature article
vulnerable to a specific compound, which could 
then be used as a pesticide for the local control 
of invasive populations. All of these possibili-
ties will require modeling and experimentation 
to establish safety and feasibility before use.
Most importantly, all decisions involving the use 
of suppression drives must involve extensive delib-
erations including but not limited to ecologists 
and citizens of potentially affected communities.
Development and release 
precautions
Because any consequences of releasing RNA-
guided gene drives into the environment would 
be shared by the local if not global community, 
research involving gene drives capable of 
spreading through wild-type populations should 
occur only after a careful and fully transparent 
review process. However, basic research into gene 
drives and methods of controlling their effects can 
proceed without risking this type of spread so 
long as appropriate ecological or molecular con-
tainment strategies are employed (Figure 8).
A great deal of information on probable eco-
logical outcomes can be obtained without testing 
or even building replication-competent gene 
drives. For example, early studies might examine 
possible ecological effects by performing con-
tained field trials with organisms that have been 
engineered to contain the desired change but   
do not possess a functional drive to spread it. 
Because they do involve transgenic organisms, 
these experiments are not completely without 
risk, but such transgenes are unlikely to spread in 
the absence of a drive.
We recommend that all laboratories seeking 
to build standard gene drives capable of spreading 
through wild populations simultaneously create 
reversal drives able to restore the original pheno-
type. Similarly, suppression drives should be 
constructed in tandem with a corresponding 
immunizing drive. These precautions would allow 
the effects of an accidental release to be swiftly if 
partially counteracted. The prevalence of gene 
drives in the environment could in principle be 
monitored by targeted amplification or metagen-
omic sequencing of environmental samples. 
Further investigation of possible monitoring 
strategies will be needed.
Transparency, public discussion, 
and evaluation
Technologies with the potential to significantly 
influence the lives of the general public demand 
societal review and consent. As self-propagating 
alterations of wild populations, RNA-guided gene 
drives will be capable of influencing entire eco-
systems for good or for ill. As such, it is impera-
tive that all research in this nascent field operate 
under conditions of full transparency, including 
independent scientific assessments of probable 
impacts and thoughtful, informed, and fully inclu-
sive public discussions.
The decision of whether or not to utilize a 
gene drive for a given purpose should be based 
entirely on the probable benefits and risks of 
Figure 8. Containment strategies and ecological risk. 
Ecological containment involves building and testing 
gene drives in geographic areas that do not harbor 
native populations of the target species. For example, 
most gene drive studies involving tropical malarial 
mosquitoes have been conducted in temperate regions 
in which the mosquitoes cannot survive or find mates. 
Molecular containment ensures that the basic require-
ments for drive are not met when mated with wild-type 
organisms. True drives must cut the homologous 
wild-type sequence and copy both the gene encoding 
Cas9 and the guide RNAs. Experiments that cut 
transgenic sequences absent from wild populations and 
copy either the gene encoding Cas9 or the guide RNAs 
- but not both - should be quite safe. Ecological or 
molecular containment should allow basic research into 
gene drive effectiveness and optimization to be 
pursued with negligible risk. Figure 8—figure 
supplement 1 categorizes these and many other 
possible experiments according to estimated risk.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.03401.016
The following figure supplement is available for figure 8:
Figure supplement 1. Estimated ecological risk of 
experiments during RNA-guided gene drive 
development. 
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that specific drive. That is, each drive should be 
judged solely by its potential outcomes, such as 
its ability to accomplish the intended aims, its 
probable effects on other species, the risk of 
spreading into closely related species by rare 
mating events, and impacts on ecosystems and 
human societies. As scientists developing these 
technologies, it will be our responsibility to make 
all empirical data and predictive models freely 
available to the public in a transparent and under-
standable format. Above all else, we must openly 
share our level of confidence in these assess-
ments as we determine how best to proceed.
Discussion
The potentially widespread implications of 
RNA-guided gene drives demand a thoughtful 
and collected response. Numerous practical dif-
ficulties must be overcome before gene drives 
will be in a position to address any of the sug-
gested applications. Many of our proposals and 
predictions are likely to fall short simply because 
biological systems are complex and difficult to 
engineer. Even so, the current rate of scientific 
advancement related to Cas9 and the many 
outcomes accessible using the simplest of gene 
drives suggest that molecular biologists will 
soon be able to edit the genomes of wild popu-
lations, reverse or update those changes in 
response to field observations, and perhaps even 
engage in targeted population suppression.
What criteria might we use to evaluate an 
RNA-guided gene drive intended to address   
a given problem? There are compelling argu-
ments in favor of eliminating insect-borne human 
diseases, developing and supporting more sus-
tainable agricultural models, and controlling 
environmentally damaging invasive species. At 
the same time, there are valid concerns regarding 
our ability to accurately predict the ecological 
and human consequences of these interven-
tions. By bringing these possibilities before the 
scientific community and the public prior to their 
realization in the laboratory, we hope to initiate 
transparent, inclusive, and well-informed dis-
cussions concerning the responsible evaluation 
and application of these nascent technologies 
(Oye et al., 2014).
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